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Initiatives designed to increase transparency have become a tool for improving governance 
and fighting corruption in the natural resource sector. The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an international organisation that administers a voluntary 
standard for natural resource revenue transparency. In line with liberal democratic ideals, 
EITI aims to empower citizens through the dissemination of information supporting 
governance improvements, public scrutiny and accountability in the sharing of benefits from 
resource extraction. Adopting a critical lens to transparency, the article examines EITI’s 
efforts to disseminate natural resource revenue data in rural Liberia. By focusing on how 
transparency is performed through dissemination workshops, the article creates a nuanced 
understanding of transparency by analysing how it is operationalised and practiced in 
encounters with people in areas where resource extraction takes place. The paper begins 
with an overview of relevant research and the conceptual framing of the study focusing on 
the performance in and of transparency and continues with a discussion of EITI 
internationally and in Liberia. Then follows a discussion of the ethnographic approach – 
travelling with the Liberian EITI-team on their dissemination trip. Through the analysis the 
article enables an understanding of the workings of transparency by examining how 
practitioners perform transparency through the performance in the workshops: the structure 
and orchestration of the workshops; and the performance of transparency by understanding 
the ways in which the workshops become spectacles that help to legitimise, rationalise and 
camouflage the fragmented and contradictory realities of extractive industries and their 
implications for people.  
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Since its announcement at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 
2002, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has emerged as a key 
institution within international natural resource governance policy, now boasting over 
50 member countries. EITI’s purpose is to establish itself as a global standard for 
natural resource governance and revenue transparency. The initiative’s rise reflects 
a more general advance of neoliberal governance agendas in the post-cold war era 
(Haufler, 2010). Structural changes associated with the globalization of trade and 
capital flows, the hegemony of free market economic policy and the pre-eminence of 
the liberal democratic model has seen a widespread re-engineering of the state and 
the geographic reorganization of regulatory duties across scales – linking to more 
localised participatory processes and international governance regimes (Jessop, 
2013; Peck, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005). In this context, transparency has become a 
celebrated policy with profound impacts for nation states and local communities and 
has been promoted as an important measure supporting good governance and 
combatting the ‘natural resource curse’ (Collier, 2008; Karl, 2007; Le Billon, 2006; 
Ross, 2012; Stiglitz, 2007). By increasing openness and information flows, 
transparency is often seen as important for democratic accountability and 
complementing multistakeholder governance initiatives that increasingly displace the 
traditional regulatory duties of the state and privilege an emerging class of non-state 
governance actors (Swyngedouw, 2005). The coordinated promotion of transparency 
has thus enrolled the support of a broad array of actors with often contradictory 
strategic and ideological agendas (Haufler, 2010). EITI gained from the backing of 
International Finance Institutions, Western governments, multinational oil and mining 
3 
 
companies, activist organizations and academic researchers helping to initiate and 
promote EITI internationally and within countries (Epremian et al., 2016; Gillies, 
2010; Haufler, 2010).  
While transparency research is often conducted with little distance to 
transparency policy (Alloa, 2018), in this article, we join an alternative critical 
perspective, viewing transparency as a performative and paradoxical phenomenon 
(Albu and Flyverbom, 2016; Strathern, 2000a) and explore how transparency is 
operationalised through practices within ‘policy implementation’. In order to 
contribute towards insights about what transparency means and how it operates, we 
explore spaces formed through the encounter between transparency practitioners 
and citizens. We approach the task through an ethnographic study of a series of 
information workshops carried out by EITI in Liberia. The workshops represent how 
transparency has been made operational, is performed, and thus reveal some of “the 
‘real’ workings of the institution” and the policy of transparency (Strathern, 2000b, p. 
314). Analysing how information dissemination is performed enables us to unpack 
ways in which transparency practitioners make their institution work and survive in 
their particular institutional, political and ideological context. The article is a 
contribution to understanding how transparency can be made to operate for 
garnering recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of ‘stakeholders’ and ‘partners’ by 
performing to the vested interests of its various audiences. In addition, we show how 
the enactment of transparency can serve to depoliticise political processes by 
superimposing its conceptual abstractions over the lived experiences of people and 
the material reality of extractive industries.  
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In the following section, we introduce a conceptual framing for the study, 
present two broad approaches to transparency research and an analytical framework 
for studying transparency as performance. We then describe the institutional and 
political context for the dissemination workshops analysed in the paper, presenting 
the global EITI project and its translation into a national governance institution in 
post-war Liberia, before introducing the reports that were the subject of the 
dissemination exercise. This section is followed by a description of our ethnographic 
approach before we analyse EITI’s dissemination workshops. In light of the account 
presented, the article concludes with a discussion on how the analysis helps to 
identify meanings and workings of transparency expressed through its practice in 
Liberia.  
2.0 Transparency as governance and performative object  
Transparency represents a longstanding ideal of western political and knowledge 
philosophy and is often associated with the classical works of Emmanuel Kant, Jean 
Jacque Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham (Baume, 2011; Birchall, 2012; Hood, 2006). 
As a concept, transparency stands at the apex of the scientific and political agendas 
of the enlightenment with its emphasis on reason and truth, and values of clarity and 
openness as moral and ethical concerns (Hansen et al., 2015). Contemporary 
transparency policy represents a specific instrumental manifestation of these ideas 
(Heald, 2006), emerging in the broader context of technological advancements in 
global communication giving birth to an ‘information age’ and widespread optimism 
around the radical democratising potential of the internet (Birchall, 2014; Mol, 2006). 
This context has seen the proliferation of transparency policies offering information 
as the solution to a host of regulatory and political problems supporting liberal goals 
5 
 
of market efficiency, bureaucratic effectiveness, democratic accountability and good 
governance (Gupta and Mason, 2014). This instrumentalisation of transparency can 
be understood as ‘governance by disclosure’ (Gupta, 2008): “public and private 
governance initiatives that employ targeted disclosure of information as a way to 
evaluate and/or steer the behaviour of selected actors” (Gupta and Mason, 2014, p. 
6). 
Below, we expand further on instrumental transparency, presenting an 
understanding of some of the conceptual and ideological commitments of 
governance by disclosure before turning our attention to two broad approaches to its 
study in the literature. 
 
2.1 Transparency’s abstract promise  
Transparency is claimed to benefit democratic governance by empowering 
citizens to scrutinize and hold powerful state- and private actors to account. 
Instrumental conceptions commonly borrow economistic rational choice models 
depicting dealings between actors as principal–agent relationships. Principal-agent 
models were originally used to depict economic relations between individuals in 
which relative access to information decides a principal’s ability to conduct 
transactions, enforce contractual obligations, and set appropriate incentives to the 
agent (see Moe, 1984; Stiglitz, 1989). According to this approach, reducing 
information asymmetries and preventing secrecy are key to accountability and better 
governance by enabling citizens to enforce the democratic (social) contract (Besley 
et al., 2002; Stiglitz, 1999).  
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This logic underpins academic support for transparency as a policy solution to 
corruption and poor natural resource governance in the resource curse literature 
(e.g. Collier, 2011; Karl, 2007; Ross, 2012). The resource curse itself is often 
understood – although not always explicitly – as a principal-agent problem whereby 
citizens, left in the dark regarding the quantity and use of abundant resource 
revenues flowing to the government are prevented from scrutinizing and making 
informed demands on government spending and allowing a (rational) inclination to 
corruption, rent-seeking and poor governance to go unchecked by the democratic 
process (Karl, 2007; Ross, 2012). 
The perspective outlined above informs mainstream liberal policy agendas, 
such as EITI. It understands transparency’s facility to bring about change according 
to a causal chain narrative whereby a transparency initiatives precipitate informed 
public debate and scrutiny, empowering citizens to hold government to account 
resulting in improved governance (for a more detailed discussion see Epremian et 
al., 2016; Gillies and Heuty, 2011; Lujala and Epremian, 2017).  
The ever-increasing preoccupation with transparency in policy circles has 
meant that the topic has received considerable attention as a research agenda. This 
is discussed in more detail below.  
 
2.2 Transparency’s empirical limits  
Research predominantly shows that enthusiasm for transparency is rarely matched 
by empirical evidence showing its utility and effectiveness. Two important findings 
predominate: 1) that while transparency initiatives seem in some cases to have 
measurable impact on project goals, the general picture is at best inconclusive with 
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frequent examples of disclosure initiatives failing to live up to their promise (Kosack 
and Fung, 2014; Lujala and Epremian, 2017); and, 2) that the impact of transparency 
frequently has paradoxical effects causing reactive behavior potentially leading to 
more, rather than less, opaque governance and bureaucratic processes (Bannister 
and Connolly, 2011; Heald, 2006; Larsson, 1998; Prat, 2006; Roberts, 2006). 
Most studies on extractive sector transparency have focused on EITI with 
much of this research based on large N cross-country studies that investigate the 
link between EITI membership and the goals of transparency on a variety of 
economic and governance indicators, such as corruption (e.g. Corrigan, 2014; 
David-Barrett and Okamura, 2016; Harnack et al., 2016; Kasekende et al., 2016; 
Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Papyrakis et al., 2017; Sovacool et al., 2016). While some 
studies offer some correlation between EITI membership and reduced corruption 
(Corrigan, 2014; Papyrakis et al., 2017), evidence for a causal link is weak. Parallel 
to this literature are a bulk of qualitative case studies focused on EITI implementation 
in specific countries generally based on stakeholder interviews (e.g. Andrews, 2016; 
O’Sullivan, 2013; Öge, 2014; Scanteam et al., 2011; Shaxson, 2009; Sovacool and 
Andrews, 2015; Van Alstine, 2014; Wilson and Van Alstine, 2014). The 
overwhelming consensus in both groups is that there is little evidence that EITI 
achieves its developmental goals such as improving governance in implementing 
countries (see Rustad et al., 2017 for a detailed overview of the research). 
Despite exceptions (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2016; Bracking, 2009), much of 
the research on EITI and transparency more generally has been conducted 
according to what Gupta and Mason call the “dominant liberal institutionalist 
perspective on the role of information and power” (2014, p. 8). While often 
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contributing valuable insights into the impacts, implementation and limitations of 
transparency schemes, the bulk of transparency research has, to varying degrees, 
been limited by an uncritical view of transparency’s normativity and underlying moral 
and epistemological assumptions – often based in principal-agent thinking (Alloa, 
2018; Gupta and Mason, 2014): research on transparency more often than not “is 
research through transparency and not about transparency” (Alloa, 2018, p. 31 
emphasis in original). 
Consequently, transparency’s failure to live up to its promise is often 
attributed to issues of poor policy design and implementation, the difficulty in 
institutionalizing practices – i.e. not enough effective transparency. Other 
explanations indicate the role of ‘challenging contexts’ that hamper implementation 
and make the intermediary assumptions in transparency’s causal chain narrative 
problematic (Epremian et al., 2016; Kosack and Fung, 2014). While a large portion of 
these studies often share a common framework and assumptions with the 
transparency-policy agenda, the observation of transparency’s sometimes 
paradoxical effects has formed the basis for a turn towards more critical research to 
which we now turn.  
  
2.3 Transparency as Object 
A number of scholars are now critically examining the contemporary concept of 
transparency itself by questioning the binary opposition between transparency and 
secrecy highlighting transparency’s ability to hide as well as illuminate material 
processes (Albu and Flyverbom, 2016; Bennington, 2011; Birchall, 2015; Fenster, 
2015; Flyverbom, 2016). This body of work criticises a view of disclosure as the 
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neutral, ‘noiseless’ transmission of information from government, in which meaning is 
self-evident and decipherable, to a public equipped to decode and act on its content 
(Fenster, 2015). The research shows how transparency policies can depoliticise the 
public sphere by redefining democratic accountability as a technical accounting 
puzzle (Birchall, 2015), or by shifting focus from political issues to the provision of 
information about them (Dean, 2002). Crucially, this body of critical research has 
shown that transparency has important material consequences by legitimising policy, 
strategic representations, and practices. Transparency is ultimately constituted 
through practices in a field where different actors, agendas, and ideological 
commitments come together to perform transparency in different settings (Albu and 
Flyverbom, 2016; Mol, 2014; Strathern, 2000b). 
  
2.4 Performing transparency – an analytical framework  
From the above review, we understand the performance of transparency as 
an assemblage of different powers, norms, interests and actors that come together 
to make transparency a dominant discourse. Transparency policy in this context 
emerges as it is performed through a process of translation and the constitution of 
meaning designed to legitimise and garner recognition for specific projects and 
policies (Mosse and Lewis, 2006).  
In analysing transparency as performance, we take inspiration from a small 
but established literature on performative governance (see Futrell, 1999; Hajer, 
2006), to which we seek to contribute through an analytical framework that takes the 
performance of transparency as it starting point. Performance itself can be 
understood in a Goffmanesque way – through an emphasis on the agency of 
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practitioners, their strategic use of dramaturgical devices and staged practices that 
can be described through theatrical metaphors (Turnhout et al., 2010).  
In developing an analytical framework, MacDonald (2010) employs three 
analytic devices of ‘structure’, ‘orchestration’ and ‘spectacle’ to study performance 
within formalised disciplining spaces of encounter, such as meetings or workshops. 
Inspired by MacDonald and borrowing from Spira’s (1999) distinction between 
performance in and performance of, we analyse Liberia EITI’s dissemination 
workshops as performing transparency simultaneously to and with different 
audiences and with multiple outcomes. Performance in refers to the way facilitators 
carry out workshops: the design, planning, presentation, orchestration and 
interaction with the immediate audience – the workshop attendees. This is about the 
dynamic on-site encounter, the real-time performance that is internal to and 
constitutive of the event.  
Performance of refers, in contrast, to the way workshops exist as signifying 
objects marking that transparency is being practiced. Here, the act of dissemination 
has meaning for an audience that is present, but also for distant audiences through 
the reporting of events (Spira, 1999). Performance of may then be understood as 
‘spectacle’. In MacDonald’s (2010) understanding, based loosely on Guy Debord’s 
(1967/1995), ‘spectacle’ is an instrument in processes of ideological and material 
domination, conditioning people to be passive observers, imposing a sense of unity 
onto situations of fragmentation and isolation.  
Through this framework, we enable an analysis of how power is manifested in 
the institutional norms, networks and scripts that guide and set limits to performance 
in accordance with acceptable ideological and discursive frameworks (Ferguson, 
11 
 
1994; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). Performance of therefore refers to the way 
discourses are actively mobilised and narratives strategically deployed within 
schemes of orchestration, but crucially also out of necessity as responses to 
institutional and political constraints experienced by practitioners (Mosse, 2005). 
Before moving on to describe our methodology and present our analysis, we will 
introduce the transparency project of EITI and its adoption in Liberia. 
3.0 The transparency project: Liberia and the EITI  
EITI was set up in 2003 as an initiative of international civil society groups 
supported by governments, the World Bank and companies. Today, national EITIs 
are governed on a tri-partite basis by a Multi-Stakeholder Steering Group (MSG) 
bringing together representatives of government, companies and civil society to 
oversee the work of a Secretariat that carries out the day-to-day work implementing 
the international EITI standard (EITI, 2013). This replicates the governance structure 
at the international level where a similarly composed board adjudicates over country 
validation and oversees the work of the International EITI Secretariat in coordinating 
membership and implementation by member countries. Although not formally 
represented as an EITI stakeholder on national and international MSGs, the support 
of donor organisations, such as the World Bank, plays a key role in the way the 
initiative operates.  
While the overarching aim subscribed to EITI is to improve governance and 
reduce corruption through increased public scrutiny and accountability of extractive 
sector revenues, EITI also proposes that membership supports public trust and 
positive perceptions of government and companies. EITI explicitly markets 
membership to governments as a way of accessing aid and investment by improving 
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the country’s reputation with donors and investors. Similarly, EITI is presented as 
enabling companies to demonstrate positive contributions to host societies and 
helping to quell tensions with local populations (EITI, n.d.). While the win-win 
narrative allows distinct rationales to coexist in the abstract realm of global policy, 
EITI’s national and local application presents further challenges to maintaining 
coherent representations and the initiative’s unity of purpose.  
 
3.1 Post-conflict governance and natural resources in Liberia 
In Liberia, the EITI began in late 2006 as a World Bank project within a 
broader set of governance reforms forced through by donors in the post-war period 
and based on its history of natural resource dependence and violent conflict. Since 
the country’s founding in the 19th century, natural resource dependence has been a 
historically defining feature of the Liberian economy and political life. The emergence 
of a concession based export economy dominated by foreign capital was reinforced 
with the expansion of large-scale mining in the mid-20th century and later timber 
concessions from the 1980s.  
Resources were also an important factor to the more immediate context for 
the present study as a crucial source of funds bankrolling warring parties during two 
periods of civil war between 1989 – 1996 and 1999 – 2003 (Global Witness, 2001; 
UN Panel of Experts, 2001). As a result, Liberia is often presented as an archetypal 
victim of the resource curse and ‘conflict resources’ – a designation that eventually 
prompted UN Security Council sanctions on the trade of diamonds and timber with 
the West African country.  
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The end of the conflict in 2003 and the democratic transition culminating in the 
election of Ellen Johnson Sirlief in 2005 paved the way for the eventual lifting of 
sanctions and an intensified peacebuilding agenda in which donors took an 
unusually hands-on approach in forcefully steering the country’s post-war 
development trajectory (Bøås, 2009). The Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (LEITI) emerged together with other initiatives parallel to a growth strategy 
focussed on reinvigorating the natural resources sectors under a new economic and 
political governance regime seen as essential to ensuring that the country, this time, 
benefitted from its resources and avoided a return to conflict (World Bank, 
2015).These technocratic reforms, while enthusiastically implemented by the 
Liberian government, failed to address longstanding modalities of Liberia’s political 
economy (Solà-Martín, 2011) often driven by informal networks of association and 
elite exploitation of state resources (Bøås and Utas, 2014; Utas, 2012, 2008). In 
practice, the liberal peacebuilding agenda of governance initiatives and the renewal 
of formal representative democracy have met a context that privileges patronage 
networks and “big man” politics (see Daloz, 2003; Utas, 2012, 2008). Here, norms 
oblige deference, rather than calling to account, in dealings with public officials and 
politicians. The ideal of accountability is further hampered by the nature of the highly 
centralised Liberian state in which direct presidential appointment guarantees 
legitimacy to all levels of officials (Sawyer, 2005) who may in addition have accrued 
added status through their war records in one of the continent’s most brutal conflicts. 
The idea of a new era in which the government ensured that people benefitted from 
the country’s resources became greatly discredited by the failure of various revenue 
sharing arrangements set up since the end of the war (UN. Panel of Experts, 2013).  
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Liberia’s post-conflict economic strategy of prioritising foreign investment in 
mining, agricultural concessions and offshore oil (Liberia PRSP, 2008), while 
resulting in rapid growth did nothing to change Liberia’s status as one of the most 
resource dependent countries in the world. In addition, the growth strategy’s relative 
continuity with Liberia’s past model also meant that the country’s fundamental 
economic and political structures remained in place (Beevers, 2015; Solà-Martín, 
2011). 
The structure of government revenues varies according to sector and type of 
concession, but involves a mix of production and export taxes, land rental fees, and 
signing bonuses. All the resource sectors have employed some form of benefit-
sharing arrangement ostensibly designed to transfer revenues to areas where 
resources are extracted – both at the county and community level.  
In reality, however, fieldwork showed that such provisions have failed to 
deliver the benefits promised to people living in resource producing areas. The 
timber sector’s National Benefit Sharing Trust Fund has never been operational, 
while the County Social Development Funds – paid into by mining and agricultural 
companies – have also been subject to pervasive mismanagement and irregularities 
according to a number of General Auditing Commission reports. In addition, initial 
plans to use 20% from the funds to compensate communities affected by company 
operations have been abandoned, with lawmakers using their influence over the 
allocation process to reinforce their local standing. 
The lack of local benefits from resource investments, including the failure of 
companies to employ local people, has become one of a number of issues 
contributing to heightened levels of conflict around concessions. The other major 
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source of tension has been conflict over land caused by the increasing rate of 
government allocation of new concessions and the expansion of existing company 
operations, often through corrupt and fraudulent practices (Global Witness et al., 
2012; Special Independent Investigating Body, 2012; UN Security Council Panel of 
Experts, 2013).   
3.2 From global policy to national institution-building in Liberia  
Liberia has become both an exemplary and an exceptional case for 
understanding transparency initiatives. Due to the role played by natural resources in 
the conflict, EITI was incorporated into the broader donor-led peace-building project 
and was positioned as one of a number of a key governance safeguards put in place 
since the end of the war to avoid past delinquencies connected to the extractive 
sectors (Dwan and Bailey, 2006). As a result, LEITI’s mandate was extended well 
beyond basic EITI requirements, expanding the initiative’s scope to include 
agriculture and forestry and broadening reporting to include the publication of 
contracts and periodic auditing of concession allocations. LEITI was in turn 
established in law through the 2009 LEITI Act guaranteeing the initiative’s mandate 
and the multistakeholder representation on the MSG. 
At the time of the fieldwork, representation on the board was comprised of 
eight state representatives1, four private sector members2, and three representatives 
of civil society3. In addition, a number of donor agencies regularly participated in the 
                                                
1 Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Lands Mines and Energy, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Forestry Development Authority, National Oil Company, the National Senate and House if 
Representatives 
2 Arcelar Mittal, BHP Billiton, Chevron, the Liberia Timber Association, and the Gold & Diamond 
Dealers & Brokers Association 




board meeting as observers4. In practice, then, the diverse interests and 
personalities represented on the MSG has meant that the role of LEITI has been less 
clear cut with government, civil society, the private sector, and donors behind the 
scenes, vying to direct the work of the Secretariat. The negotiations have involved 
different interests, but also the collision of distinct rationales for EITI implementation. 
The LEITI Secretariat’s work is therefore carried out in front of a heterogeneous 
audience, requiring implementation to respond to a number of divergent 
expectations. While civil society representatives generally described LEITI as a 
vehicle for supporting greater accountability and giving them a foothold in 
governance processes, government and private sector representatives articulated 
LEITI’s role as combatting suspicion and conflict related to extractive projects. 
Amongst donors, on the other hand, EITI was increasingly discussed in terms of its 
contribution to a wider reform agenda. 
3.2 The dissemination project 
With joint World Bank and African Development Bank funding, the 
dissemination began in April 2014 aiming to present two recent reports 
commissioned by LEITI: the Annual Reconciliation Report and the Post Award 
Process Audit. The dissemination was to be carried out by LEITI staff consisting of 
two to three workshops in each of Liberia’s fifteen counties. Laid out in planning 
documents, LEITI’s formal objective for the workshops was to: 1) “educate citizens 
on the key findings and major areas of concerns in the reports”; and 2) to create “a 
platform for citizens to discuss the reports, make recommendations to improve the 
process, or take other actions where necessary” (LEITI, 2014, p. 1). A key aspect 
                                                
4African Development Bank, German Development Cooperation, IMF, UN Development Program, UN 
Mission in Liberia, US State Department and the World Bank 
17 
 
alluded to by LEITI management was the role of the workshops in distributing 
information to people living in rural areas where the consequences of resource 
extraction were felt most directly and facilitating discussion and debate between 
stakeholders gathered at the events. Additionally, the dissemination was conceived 
as a form of two-way communication between ‘communities’ and government, with 
LEITI playing the role of conduit for the flow of information back to ministries in 
Monrovia.  
The primary focus of the dissemination was on distributing LEITI’s 4th Annual 
Reconciliation Report (LEITI, 2013a). Reconciliation reports represent the core 
activity of EITI and include data on payments made by companies to government 
based on comparing amounts reported by each party and highlighting eventual 
discrepancies. In accordance with EITI rules, the findings and data from the 
reconciliation report were published in a more accessible summary report (LEITI, 
2013b) that in turn formed the basis for the content of the dissemination workshops. 
LEITI’s 4th reconciliation report differed from those in most other countries at the 
time. Firstly, it provided information on “what ought to have been paid” meaning that 
auditors made independent calculations of company tax obligations required by law 
comparing them to government calculations of due amounts. This revealed 
systematic underpayment by a number of companies and a failure of government to 
pursue the full tax obligations required by law. Secondly, auditors attempted to 
“follow the money” – tracing specific earmarked payments within the state system. 
Two payments from oil companies were highlighted where the subsequent 
forwarding of payments was not properly documented by the National Oil Company. 
Notwithstanding these issues, the 4th Report, like previous reports carried out by 
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LEITI, did not clearly indicate any acts of corruption. The second, more controversial, 
report was the Post Award Process Audit (LEITI, 2013c), which assessed 
government adherence to procedural obligations in allocating concessions and 
exploitation contracts. The report’s finding that 64 of 68 contracts had not been 
authorised in compliance with the law resulted in conflict within the MSG as civil 
society, company and government representatives clashed over the accompanying 
recommendations that would need to be submitted to the president. Consequently, 
the audit was politically sensitive for secretariat staff who were careful in public to 
describe the contracts in question as ‘non-compliant’ rather than ‘illegal’.  
4.0 Studying transparency as performance 
Tracing the implementation process of transparency requires tracing a ‘chain 
of translations’ (Mosse and Lewis, 2006) as global policy is heterogeneously 
manifested in project rationales and designs, and the work of practitioners who seek 
to rationalise their practices according to the multi-scaled contexts in which they 
operate. It is through their performance of transparency policy that practitioners 
respond to these dynamic pressures. The study takes an ethnographic approach to 
explore the performance of implementing transparency as policy by analysing the 
organisation and execution of a number of the workshops for disseminating the 
reports outlined above. Here, we understand dissemination as a necessity to achieve 
recognition internationally and among all stakeholders and partners, described in 
EITI documents as ‘audiences’: actors within government, the donor community, 
extractive companies, civil society and the media (EITI, 2008). The dissemination is 
analysed through the experience, participation and observations of the lead 
researcher who travelled, lodged, shared meals and socialised with the LEITI team 
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on their dissemination trip. As an active participant, the lead researcher documented 
the trip through written notes and reflections as well as recording three of the 
workshops5. Conversations with staff during the journey, the experience of travel, the 
affective build-up before and after meetings – including various negotiations with 
local stakeholders – played a crucial role in understanding transparency as practice. 
Insights from interviews conducted prior and after the dissemination with LEITI staff, 
LEITI MSG members and other stakeholders representatives from national and local 
government, local, national and international civil society, extractive companies, 
donors, and political and local community representatives have also contributed to 
the analysis in the paper. The observation and participation in the dissemination was 
part of a long process of studying LEITI6, interviewing staff, sitting in on other 
meetings, interviewing stakeholders, and observing the implementation of 
transparency at different levels in the state system and in the regions. The lead 
researcher conducted fieldwork in a number of locations both in rural Liberia and the 
capital Monrovia prior and subsequent to the dissemination carrying out 146 
interviews with more than 80 specifically in five areas where important forestry and 
mining concessions were being operated.  
The researcher’s fellow travellers were all male representatives of LEITI: two 
mid-level employees and a driver from the Secretariat, and one member of the LEITI 
MSG. The group left Monrovia on the 23rd of April, 2014, headed for Greenville in 
Sinoe County, the location for the first of a planned twelve workshops to be carried 
out in the South East of the country7. Figure 1 shows the route, planned workshop 
locations and the concession areas. The team’s journey was realised over the next 
                                                
5 This material consisted of one video and two audio recordings.  
6 Fieldwork totaling seven months was carried out in Liberia between February 2013 and June 2014. 
7 Sinoe, Grand Kru, Maryland, River Gee and Grand Gedeh counties. 
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eleven days across a region historically referred to as Liberia’s hinterland, where 
post-war infrastructure improvements are lacking. 
By travelling with the team, the lead-researcher became very much part of the 
dissemination, sometimes helping to set up before the events, making notes during 
the workshops – which was seen as a useful resource by the team, while 
conversations that the researcher had with the team became part of the presentation 
that the team made in the workshops. While the team was aware of the researcher’s 
outsider role within the group, at times attendees took the researcher for one of the 
LEITI team. Often people took him for the senior member in the group, presumably 
due to being the only white man. During the workshops, attendees would regularly 
approach the researcher to give thanks for the workshops, or to make complaints, 
thinking that he had the authority to intervene on their behalf. This was most often 
related to the attendance fee or access to reports – issues to which we return below. 
Due to limited time at each location, these informal encounters were the only 
conversations held with participants and the paper does not thus aim to present the 
experience of attendees. The researcher’s ethnographic practice was one of 
‘observant participant’ (Thrift, 2000): both as a witness to transparency in-the-making 
and through his conspicuous presence and integration within the team – a full 
member of ‘the cast’ whose performance constituted the workshops. As a 
researcher, he thus did participate, and while questioning some aspects of the 
dissemination, did not directly contest the practices of the team, but tried through 
conversations and observant participation to understand the team’s performance of 
transparency through the journey and the workshops.  
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Before we move to our analysis, we would like to return to our framework of 
performing transparency. Crucially, the presence and participation of people in the 
performance in transparency is itself an integral element to the enactment of 
transparency. From the recorded data, we undertake an analysis of performance in 
by unpacking how structure and orchestration are brought to bear through the 
concrete practices involved in organising and coordinating events. We focus on the 
effect of these practices in limiting the range and type of possible interactions, as 
well as decisions that conditioned people’s ability and entitlement to participate as a 
means to better understand the aims of organisers (MacDonald, 2010). 
We understand the workshops as spaces that are produced through the 
strategic practices of LEITI staff who, while always subject to disciplining structures, 
also manoeuver through their own agency in planning and executing the workshops.  
Performance of may then be understood to rely on the social pressures that push 
participants to synchronise their interactions with dominant discourses, thus 
reproducing subjectivities and constraining possibilities for alternative articulations 
(Butler, 1990). A focus on performance as a way of analysing the workshops allows 
us to study how discourse relates to the governance setting as it is enacted through 
practices and revealed by the encounters and interactions that are produced (Hajer, 
2006).  
 
Figure 1. about here 
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5.0 Performing in transparency: structure and orchestration of the 
workshops 
The dissemination was planned as one of three trips intended to cover all of Liberia’s 
fifteen counties. LEITI Secretariat staff and management selected workshop sites 
prioritising both regional coverage – by planning two to three workshops in each of 
the five counties of the south east –, and attendance by selecting locations based on 
population size to meet attendance targets of 200 – 250 people per workshop. 
Responsibility for organising venues, publicising the events (usually via local radio) 
and invitations to specific attendees was subcontracted to LEITI’s contacts in each of 
the locations. Usually these were local members of civil society, journalists, or, in 
one instance, a government official. How particular workshops were organised and 
who, and how many, people were invited depended greatly on the networks and 
priorities of these organisers. Attendance registers showed that attendees came 
predominately from the immediate more urban areas meaning that attendance by 
people living directly adjacent to concessions was very limited. In line with standard 
practice in Liberia, organisers would try to ensure representation from local elders, 
chiefs and women’s and youth representatives in addition to local officials, civil 
society, local media, political representatives and companies. However, not all of 
these groups were represented in all of the workshops.  
The planning of the dissemination had a bearing on how workshops were 
structured and orchestrated in particular ways toward a number of objectives, 
achieved through the management of proceedings and people, and the articulation 
of a number of strategic representations. Below, we describe and analyse these 




5.2 Structure and organisation of workshops 
The first key element to running a ‘successful’ workshop was fulfilling EITI’s formal 
dissemination requirements of communicating the principal findings of the annual 
reconciliation report, distributing the summary reports, and instigating public 
discussions amongst ‘stakeholders’. This was in addition to the specific demands of 
those donors who had financed the trip requiring attention to professional norms and 
procedures. The other key element of success that became apparent was that 
events were well attended and ran smoothly according to a predetermined itinerary, 
while keeping conflict and discussions considered controversial to a minimum.  
The team would arrive at a venue, usually the city or town hall and begin by 
setting up the ‘stage’. This involved erecting four banners summarizing the most 
important information from the reconciliation report. One banner was a national 
overview of the total amounts paid to government in each natural resource sector. 
The other banners had information summarized regionally. A member of the team 
would set up a table for registering participants. People would endure long waits in 
line to register and copies of the summary reconciliation report were distributed.  
For attendees, registration was necessary to receive the $5 ‘sitting fee’, which 
appeared in many cases to be the principal motivation for attending. LEITI aimed for 
250 participants in each event. Generally, however, attendance was not much more 
than 200 and, in some cases the team would use the promise of financial 
compensation to attract passers-by to bolster the numbers. Registration also 
reinforced difference between the attendees themselves, as more prominent figures 
were not required to stand in line and register, but nevertheless received their (often 
higher) payment at the end of the event.   
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An important requirement of LEITI’s work is to bring together all actors in 
discussions on natural resource governance. In the workshops, people were seated 
facing the stage in the typical manner of an audience, while local officials were 
seated to one side of the stage facing them. Participants who stood up to ask 
questions and give their opinions would have to do so facing the officials, but 
prominent government and political representatives are seldom openly challenged 
and criticised at public meetings by ordinary people. In one such instance, attendees 
were faced by representatives of a county administration that had, in the months 
prior to the workshop, engaged in a campaign of intimidation against local people 
involved in a land dispute with a foreign palm oil company, involving arbitrary arrests, 
and physical brutality by police (Global Witness, 2015). In addition, the company had 
sent observers to the meeting who made their presence felt, sitting in on the 
workshop and parking the company vehicle prominently at the entrance to the 
venue.  
Commencing workshops, the facilitator would welcome attendees, present the 
team and organise the singing of the national anthem, before inviting the most senior 
public official to give a welcoming address. The facilitator then presented LEITI 
explicitly describing it as a “government agency”, a characterisation that was 
designed to garner credibility in the eyes of the specific audience at the workshops, 
but stood in contrast to the official line articulated by the Head of Secretariat 
emphasising LEITI’s tripartite status and independence from the government.  
The main portion of the workshops began with a presentation by LEITI of the 
main findings from the annual reconciliation report. In addition to information about 
the findings, the purpose of the presentation was the marketing and legitimating of 
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LEITI as a key governance watchdog. In contrast to the somewhat limited scope of 
its activities, EITI was presented as a key protagonist in Liberia’s post-war 
development trajectory highlighting its role in preventing conflict and ensuring 
development through the fair and equitable distribution of extractive sector revenues. 
5.3 Orchestrating discussion 
Following the initial presentation, the facilitator opened up for participation 
from the audience. Audience members would raise their hands to either make a 
statement, or ask a question. In each case, the facilitator would respond and move 
on. This more interactive portion of proceedings was important to LEITI’s formal 
goals of contributing to “informed debate about how natural resources are being 
governed” (LEITI, 2013d, p. 10), where participants could potentially raise more 
contentious issues related to prevailing practices and political relations around 
resource extraction.  
As described above, however, the composition of attendees and the way the 
events were organised meant that certain norms of accepted behaviour were 
privileged with the effect of constraining the potential for discussions to step onto 
more radical terrain. Furthermore, the team orchestrated the discussion through 
framing the question and answer session around the initial presentation. This 
ensured that most participants asked questions related to issues the team had an 
interest in discussing – the contents of the summary report. Crucially, the 
presentation made no mention of the more controversial Post Award Process report 
(see section 3.3) reducing the likelihood of discussions straying onto the legitimacy 
of company operations. 
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Nevertheless, participants did in some cases raise concerns regarding issues 
not directly addressed by the presentation. Key frustrations related to the inadequacy 
of existing benefit sharing mechanisms, the failure of companies to live up to 
promises made to local people, as well as more general scepticism regarding the 
potential of extractive projects to benefit local people. In a few cases, people raised 
the subject of how to oppose the companies’ operations. The team’s replies seldom 
addressed the people’s concerns and were instead intended to prevent confrontation 
and the discussion from straying on to more radical terrain.  
In such instances, it was often women who spoke most forcefully about 
confronting companies, challenging government, and calling for action to secure 
community benefits. However, it seemed easier for the LEITI team to cut women’s 
critical comments off: “(He cut) her off because she had been talking for a while. 
Next, he shouted out a slogan about women’s empowerment and got the crowd to 
join in. This seemed to involve a good degree of irony and seemed to be funny to 
many of those present who chuckled and he himself was smiling broadly.” (From 
field notes, 25.04.2014). Such strategies were generally enough to allow the 
facilitator to move on without engaging directly with sensitive subject matter. 
6.0 The performance of transparency: spectacle and audience 
Once you hold the information, you can then go and engage the government (…) 
knowledge is power (From LEITI’s presentation in the workshops). 
 
The workshops become spectacles in that they are theatrical performances 
that help to legitimise, rationalise and camouflage (see Boje, 2001; Igoe, 2010) the 
fragmented realities of extractive industries and their implications for people. 
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Analysing the workshops as performance of transparency helps to provide insights 
into the meanings of transparency as they are acted out by LEITI and to understand 
what audience transparency is performed for. We explore the relations between 
LEITI and the participants through the constitution of the ‘public’ made visible in the 
understandings of democracy and its citizens conveyed in the workshops. We then 
show how the relationship between information, knowledge and power was 
expressed during the workshops, and finally how the performance of transparency 
that we analyse relates to broader institutional and political structures and agendas. 
6.1 Between transparency and the citizen: the making of ‘the public’ 
Aside from the explicit purpose of disseminating information on resource 
revenues to the public, in practice the events were celebratory displays – symbolic 
objects conveying a spatially distinct mode of democratic governance where 
‘Monrovia’ travelled out to the people in an act that represented a break with the past 
and the dominant post-war narrative of decentralisation, democracy and citizen 
participation. However, these displays were in some ways contradictory to the 
purpose of bringing knowledge to the people as was demonstrated by the team’s 
cancellation of several of the planned workshops. The artisanal mining town of 
Government Camp was considered too remote and not populated enough to warrant 
the journey. Similarly, the planned workshops in Grandcess, Sasstown and Ziah 
Town were cancelled with the team reasoning that the small populations of the towns 
promised low attendance not in line with their targets. 
The seeming lack of importance place on these places contrasted with the 
way the workshops that did take place were carried out. The ceremonial opening and 
closing of the events contributed to creating a sense of occasion and coherence that 
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distracted from the more fragmented conditions and practices through which the 
workshops had been constituted. Women and youth would be selected to give 
closing comments that often took the form of passionate calls to action. However, 
while giving these groups a platform from which to articulate their views, these 
addresses took place after the facilitator had formally brought an end to the 
discussion and were treated as part of the closing formalities.  
 In instrumental discourse on transparency, people are understood in terms of 
a ‘public’ that stands as the receiver of information freed from the transparent state 
(Fenster, 2015). The way the workshops were orchestrated brought people more 
actively into the performance, casting them as engaged citizens who performed their 
role through acts of questioning and requiring answers of LEITI staff. However, as 
we described above, when transparency is performed in the workshops, ‘the public’ 
is used more concretely to describe a group of people – ‘citizens’ – that make up the 
audience. It is a performance that ignores diversity of interests and power relations, 
constituting people in the abstract into a particular role of a specific kind of citizen: a 
rational actor with identifiable and predictable preferences who sees their 
relationship to the state as a (social) contract that they will actively engage in 
enforcing, when endowed with sufficient knowledge. The LEITI reports were 
presented as informing ‘voter power’ enabling people to hold political representatives 
to account at the ballot box. Government was portrayed according to its 
constitutional role, dependent on citizens for its mandate and consequently 
responsive to their demands. This framing was key to LEITI’s depiction of the 
reconciliation report as a vital tool enabling citizens to participate fully in democratic 
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governance processes and legitimising the facilitator’s declaration to participants: 
“you yourself can now advise government.”  
Those in government who are formally answerable for the governance of the 
country’s resources were not present. Questions were instead fielded by LEITI staff 
and there is little indication that LEITI’s frequent claims of taking people’s concerns 
back to the government corresponds to what happens in practice. As such, the 
questions and input of participants functioned mostly as aesthetic markers signifying 
an idealised democratic governance and giving the workshops the appearance and 
form of productive encounters – constructive meetings between state and newly 
enlightened and empowered citizens. 
 
6.2 Transmitting empowerment: knowledge and information in transparency 
Transparency is understood to represent “a communicative act, one that advances in 
a linear fashion as a message moves from the state to the public” (Fenster, 2015, p. 
153). However, it is a conception in which the problematic issue of meaning in 
transparency is either ignored or is reduced to a stable neutral entity. Consequently, 
it was never made apparent how in practice people could use the reports and what 
kinds of demands the information would enable people to make. Instead, the dense 
numerical information served a more symbolic visual purpose, with the very 
impenetrability of the numerous pages of text, tables and charts supporting the 
facilitator’s representation of the reports as containing important much needed 
information, while the glossy pamphlets represented tangible objects – knowledge 
that could be held and physically conveyed. Holding aloft his copy of the report the 
facilitator told participants “you here, you have the power”. In this sense, the 
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workshops performed empowerment as an exercise in knowledge transfer through 
the physical handing over the reports, but it was a display that relied on the double 
manoeuvre of conflating information with knowledge and, in turn, equating 
knowledge with power according to the popular trope.  
Much of the information presented in the workshop, albeit superficial, seemed 
difficult to grasp for many of the participants, particularly for the non-English 
speakers and no formal arrangements were made for translating between English 
and the local languages. Complaints from people who found it hard to keep up with 
the presentation were met with the suggestion that they had the report and could go 
through it in their own time.  
The team also made important choices regarding what information to share, 
and typically excluded themes linked to specific companies and concessions in the 
local area. In one workshop, a member of the audience asked for LEITI to tell the 
communities what and how much was owed to them by the companies and 
government. The facilitator responded by directing people to read the concession 
agreements by accessing them online or travelling to LEITI’s offices in Monrovia, 
neither of which were viable options for most participants.  
Perhaps the most significant decision pertaining to what information to share 
was regarding the overall finding from the Post Award Process Audit that 64 of 68 
contract processes were found to be ‘non-compliant’. What ‘non-compliance’ meant 
and the significance of the findings – that the legality of the majority of concession 
contracts awarded since 2009 could potentially be called into question – was not 
shared with participants. Neither was the fact that a number of the companies 
31 
 
concerned were the very same companies operating in the local area that in some 
cases were involved in ongoing disputes with local people.  
 The circumspect approach to sharing information contrasted starkly with the 
theatrical manner in which it was acted out. The workshops performed to 
metaphorical notions of transparency as 'shedding light', giving 'clarity' and 'insight' 
and the attainment of truth and moral certainty (Albu and Flyverbom, 2016). A key 
factor for the success of the dissemination trips was to demonstrate LEITI’s 
importance in bringing this insight – allowing people to ‘see’. The audience played 
their role both as passive receivers of information, and through appreciative 
confirmations that “today our eyes are open”, an echo of the facilitator’s 
proclamations of the audience’s transition from ignorance to enlightenment.  
6.2 The political economy of transparency: maintaining status quo 
Framed around a particular understanding of the relationship between 
knowledge and information and what type of and whose knowledge counts, the 
performance involved providing information in a way that met the expectations of a 
variety of (influential) actors – most of whom are members and observers on LEITI’s 
MSG.  
People in the workshops were often eager to discuss what would be done 
about corruption and malpractice and what action LEITI would itself take to hold 
those responsible to account. In one instance, a participant asked what would be 
done in a specific case where the National Oil Company had failed to account for a 
payment of $100,000. A member of the team responded telling the audience, “I am 
here to give you information. What you do with that information is up to you." While 
seemingly contradicting earlier claims regarding LEITI’s important watchdog status, 
32 
 
the response was nevertheless consistent with the way transparency was presented 
and the designation of specific roles to citizens, the state and information released 
through transparency. In the team’s discursive representations transparency 
expressed empowerment, but, contextualised by such encounters, transparency 
rather took the form of an abdication, a shifting of the burden of enforcing 
governance standards from the state onto the shoulders of marginalised ‘citizens.’ 
As discussed above, a principal concern of the LEITI team was to avoid 
specific controversial subject matter that risked inspiring more discontent with 
concessionaires. Conversations with LEITI management revealed that a clear goal 
for the dissemination was to provide information that would increase trust and ease 
suspicion in communities: “we want to be there tranquilising. We want to be there in 
that space where our objectivity, our autonomy, helps to allay tensions in these 
communities.” An explicit message frequently articulated by LEITI at the workshops 
was that people should not oppose companies, whose presence in Liberia was vital 
to development. A version of reality was thus presented where direct opposition to 
company operations was inherently illegitimate, and where the only reasonable 
course of action was for citizens to use LEITI reports to engage a supposedly 
benevolent government in discussions over the use of revenues.  
The team also pointed out that “it is a long way to Monrovia” telling people to 
take their concerns to local officials and political representatives rather than lobbying 
ministries and the president in the capital. By asking people to engage locally, they 
were directing people’s political action away from national level political spaces 
where decisions are made and into spaces where the effect of protest would at best 
be diffuse and indirect. More importantly in the present context, local political spaces 
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emphasise people’s dependence on local relations of power and patronage networks 
and represent limited possibilities for political action in Liberia. The effect of LEITI’s 
approach was therefore to discourage the ‘scaling-up’ of actions into spaces where 
engagement had greater possibility of fostering change by engaging with the state’s 
highly centralised decision-making processes. 
 
7.0 Towards an understanding of the meanings and workings of 
transparency as governance 
 
Transparency – often taken for granted as a common good – is believed to 
support good governance and democracy by empowering the public with knowledge. 
It may not be possible to assess what impact the workshops had such terms, but the 
events we have narrated cast doubt on whether empowerment and accountability 
represent the primary concerns to which LEITI’s dissemination responds. ‘Success’ 
and ‘failure’ of the workshops can instead be understood through their function of 
providing legitimacy to claims of success for broader projects of EITI and other 
influential actors linked to LEITI. From this follows that transparency, rather than 
bringing light to its citizens, performs a practice of governance by disclosure.  
Studying the dissemination as performance in and of helps to reveal the 
workshops as spaces where transparency is expressed through the practices of 
LEITI staff and their relations with attendees and the wider audience for their work. 
Practitioners operate in a context where their actions have distinct significance at 
multiple levels of governance. The operational reality is a constant negotiation, often 
necessitating ambiguity in the signalling of meaning attached to practices that are 
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viewed simultaneously through the heterogeneous expectations of multiple 
audiences at multiple levels. EITI’s tripartite make-up points to this explicitly and 
builds such a context of ambiguity into the formal structures surrounding their work. 
A particular practice may be understood as an attempt to simultaneously play to the 
expectations of donors, government, the International EITI secretariat, national and 
international civil society groups, and the various people who attend the workshops. 
The practices discussed in this article should be viewed as attempts by LEITI staff to 
balance conflicting expectations within their work. This unenviable task was 
performed by staff with the knowledge that their actions would be scrutinised by a 
variety of influential actors on which employees and LEITI’s institutional survival 
depends. What is crucial, however, is how transparency emerges in practice and is 
produced through relations of power. In a given context, the performance of 
transparency is, therefore, directed towards ‘those who count’, and directed mostly 
towards those who count the most.  
Transparency reconfigures relationships between information and those 
people and institutions that prepare it for public consumption (see Power, 1997 in 
Koyama & Kania, 2014). The workshops represent the mediation of the relationship 
between policy, information, the government, the industries and the people from 
where an idealised version of reality is performed for particular audiences.  We have 
shown that the workshops, as the practice of transparency, help to conflate the real 
workings of power in natural resource extraction. Through the workshops a particular 
version of the material reality in which people live is created. This version is 
compatible with the policy narratives of EITI and more broadly with a prevailing 
growth strategy supported by government and donors where commercial interests 
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are frequently pitted against those of local people. We show that the dissemination 
trips were political spectacles that conceal real policy costs and benefits helping to 
depoliticise the transparency process by making critical interrogation and democratic 
participation more difficult (see Uddin et al., 2011; Winton and Evans, 2014).  
The workshops represented governance as an aesthetic expression (Eggen, 
2012) in that the act of ‘giving sight’ (dissemination) took precedence over the sight 
itself (knowledge). The workshops, as key to the success of LEITI’s work, were 
therefore vehicles for showing LEITI to be ‘bringers of light’, but the workshops 
cannot be dismissed merely as aesthetic. What is important is to understand the 
effects of this performance – how the objects and subjects of transparency were 
constituted through strategic representations and practices in the workshops – and 
how transparency produces spaces whereby visibilities are made and managed 
(Flyverbom, 2016; Strathern, 2000b).   
In this context, the coherence of the dissemination exercise was maintained 
through the performance that assigned roles to citizens, government, companies, 
LEITI and the reports they produce and distribute. In this view, transparency’s 
abstract categories and modes of relations, while illusory abstractions, work to 
encourage neoliberal subjects whose political agency is individualised to that of 
citizen watchdogs, and who are made responsible for enforcing a democratic 
accountability redefined according to the administrative logic of auditing (Birchall, 
2015, p. 19). 
The approach we have taken enables us to look beyond practices of 
transparency as merely contradictory to idealised notions of transparency, towards 
understanding them as the expression of more fundamental contradictions within 
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transparency. By considering transparency as governance in Liberia and worldwide, 
we have pointed to the ways in which transparency becomes a spectacle that helps 
to depoliticise and pacify the public in relation to securing their interests vis a vis the 
interests of industry and government. The spectacle of transparency distracts from 
the content and objects that transparency ostensibly aims to make known. In this 
context, spectacle as transparency may be a contradiction in terms in that some 
dimensions of reality are concealed through the portrayal of others. Selective and 
strategic representations are ever-present features of participatory processes and 
political projects. The insidious paradox of transparency may be that it enables such 
representations to be made under the guise of enlightenment itself.  
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Figure 1. A concession map of Liberia showing locations and route of LEITI’s dissemination to the south 
east, 2014* 
*Data for Plantation agriculture and Mining represent Agricultural Concessions and Mineral Development Agreements 
respectively. Forestry represents aggregated data comprising Forest Management Contracts, Timber Sale Contracts, 
Community Forest Management Agreements and Private Use Permits. Offshore Oil blocks, class B and C mining licenses and 
exploration licenses are not shown. Workshop locations not on travel route represent cancelations.  
Data sources: (Bunte et al., 2017; GADM, 2015; WFP-Geonode, 2017). 
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